How a Representative of a Top Chechen Leader ‘Solved’ Russian Business Disputes — And Walked Away With Millions

The Chechen Republic is one of Russia’s poorest regions, its budget supported largely by assistance from the central government.

But the republic’s power brokers don’t hesitate to flaunt their wealth. Ramzan Kadyrov, Chechnya’s longtime Moscow-backed leader, loves thoroughbred horses and exotic animals and invites Hollywood stars to his birthday parties. His daughter hosted a fashion show in Paris. And until he was banned from the site, he used to fill his Instagram page with shots of himself in expensive cars and luxurious interiors.

PARTNER STORY

Read this story in Russian at The Project.

Kadyrov says that his money comes from God. But Chechen elites also have more worldly sources of income. Reporters from The Project, an independent Russian publication and OCCRP partner, have catalogued multiple business disputes in which a little-known Russian businessman, Pavel Krotov, has stepped in to broker a resolution — only to end up with a considerable portion of the assets.

Credit: Russian State DumaAdam Delimkhanov (right) in the Russian State Duma with Buvaisar Saitiyev (left), a deputy from Dagestan.

In each lucrative case, sources say, Krotov was representing the interests of Adam Delimkhanov, a member of the Russian parliament and among the most powerful politicians in the Chechen Republic after Kadyrov himself.

The contours of several of these stories have been reported separately. But emails sent and received by Krotov and obtained by reporters, as well as new interviews with inside sources and corporate and property records, show that his involvement in each of these disputes was part of a larger pattern.

An authenticated police document appears to confirm what multiple sources are too afraid to say on the record: Krotov’s methods included strong-arming the opposing parties. While investigating a formal complaint against Krotov, police noted that the businessmen used “unjustified criminal-law methods of influence.” In interviews, half a dozen sources told reporters that Krotov had a pattern of invoking his connections to Delimkhanov, which is why they feared for their safety and refused to let reporters use their names.

Credit: Embassy of Grenada in RussiaThe only publicly available photo of Pavel Krotov — now removed — is from the website of Grenada’s embassy in Russia, which listed him as a trade attache.

Nor did any of the main parties to the business conflicts described in this story agree to speak to reporters on the record. A majority of those who were contacted refused to speak under any circumstances.

Krotov himself denies any ties to the Chechen politicians, dismissing reporters’ questions as “pure nonsense.”

“I’ve never been any kind of negotiator,” he said. “I do business. I work to create.” Krotov said that all his investments were made with his own money and that he does not know Kadyrov or Delimkhanov. “As an Orthodox Christian Russian person, I definitely don’t work for any Chechen elites,” he said. He also denied many specific claims in the cases where he allegedly resolved disputes.

Representatives of Delimkhanov and Kadyrov did not respond to requests for comment.

“Closer Than a Brother”

Ramzan Kadyrov has been generous in his praise of Adam Delimkhanov. In fact, Kadyrov once referred to the legislator as his successor. “I’ve prepared a person who can replace me,” he told an interviewer in 2009. “Adam Delimkhanov. My closest friend. Closer than a brother.”

In the 1990s, Delimkhanov reportedly worked as a driver for Salman Raduev, a notorious Chechen terrorist who took hundreds of civilians hostage during the first Chechen war. But Delimkhanov switched sides in 1999, taking part in operations against Chechen militants and even surviving an assassination attempt.

Delimkhanov’s violent side is well-known in Russia’s parliament. In one incident, after a disagreement with a fellow legislator about Chechnya, Delimkhanov punched him in the head, setting off a struggle during which he accidentally dropped a gold-plated pistol.

In the 2000s he served in Chechnya’s interior ministry, eventually becoming the republic’s first deputy prime minister in charge of security issues. In 2007, he was elected to the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian parliament.

The Russian media has linked Delimkhanov to several killings of Kadyrov’s enemies, though he has never been charged with murder in Russia. In 2009, Dubai authorities accused him of murdering a former Chechen general. Delimkhanov, a member of parliament, was on Interpol’s wanted list for several years. He has denied all these charges.

In 2014, he was sanctioned by the United States for connections with the Brothers’ Circle, a regional organized criminal group.

Collecting a Debt

The first known episode in which Pavel Krotov appeared to act on Delimkhanov’s behalf arose in 2010.

Credit: EurocementFilaret Galchev.

Filaret Galchev, the billionaire owner of Eurocement Group, Russia’s largest cement producer, was in a tough spot. In 2007, Galchev had bought out a partner’s minority share of the business for US$1 billion, agreeing to pay annual installments of $200 million.

But, having made the first two payments on time, he missed the third. Galchev’s former partner first took him to court, then grew tired of waiting and sold the remainder of his debt at a discount. The right to demand payment from Galchev for the remaining sum of $600 million was purchased by Krotov, a businessman who at the time was registered only as the CEO or co-owner of smaller companies with no major assets.

Once Krotov got involved, Galchev found a way to pay his debt almost immediately.

At the time, citing unnamed sources, the Russian business media reported that Krotov was a representative of Delimkhanov, with few further details.

Now, evidence newly obtained by The Project confirms this earlier reporting, linking Krotov with Russia’s most powerful Chechens.

“A Few False Entrances”

Four people who have had business relations with Krotov confirmed to reporters that he was a representative of Delimkhanov. None allowed reporters to use their names, citing safety concerns.

Two specialists — Alexei Shlyapuzhnikov, a security consultant for Transparency International, and a member of OCCRP’s technology team — examined the emails used in this story and said they appeared to be authentic, although their digital signatures were either missing or outdated, so their origin could not be definitively confirmed.

Reporters also obtained thousands of private emails sent and received by Krotov. The emails show that his interlocutors understood him to be acting on behalf of Delimkhanov.

They also show that Krotov had ties to Kadyrov. In the late 2000s, he was involved in the management of the construction of the politician’s residence. The correspondence discussed such details as the building’s budget, its design, and its security features.

In the correspondence, Krotov receives recommendations from a contractor on how best to secure the Chechen leader’s compound: “it is better to bring the bunker out beyond the perimeter of the building and connect them with underground passages. Ideally, none of the staff should know where the entrance to the bunker is located. Maybe it’s worth organizing a few false entrances,” the attachment to one email reads.

Credit: The ProjectA 3D rendering of a proposed bathroom in Kadyrov’s Tsentaroy residence, obtained from the email correspondence.

“From the point of view of safety,” it continues, “it’s bad to place the President’s apartments above the administrative spaces, since it is theoretically possible to bring an explosive device in there.”

One of the people involved in the construction work also told reporters that Krotov was “working for Delimkhanov.”